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Abstract Equilibrium modeling is common in a variety of fields such as game
theory and transportation science. The inputs for these models, however, are of-
ten difficult to estimate, while their outputs, i.e., the equilibria they are meant to
describe, are often directly observable. By combining ideas from inverse optimiza-
tion with the theory of variational inequalities, we develop an efficient, data-driven
technique for estimating the parameters of these models from observed equilibria.
We use this technique to estimate the utility functions of players in a game from
their observed actions and to estimate the congestion function on a road network
from traffic count data. A distinguishing feature of our approach is that it supports
both parametric and nonparametric estimation by leveraging ideas from statistical
learning (kernel methods and regularization operators). In computational experi-
ments involving Nash and Wardrop equilibria in a nonparametric setting, we find
that a) we effectively estimate the unknown demand or congestion function, re-
spectively, and b) our proposed regularization technique substantially improves
the out-of-sample performance of our estimators.
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1 Introduction
Modeling phenomena as equilibria is a common approach in a variety of fields.
Examples include Nash equilibrium in game theory, traffic equilibrium in trans-
portation science and market equilibrium in economics. Often, however, the model
primitives or “inputs” needed to calculate equilibria are not directly observable
and can be difficult to estimate. Small errors in these estimates may have large
impacts on the resulting equilibrium. This problem is particularly serious in design
applications, where one seeks to (re)design a system so that the induced equilib-
rium satisfies some desirable properties, such as maximizing social welfare. In this
case, small errors in the estimates may substantially affect the optimal design.
Thus, developing accurate estimates of the primitives is crucial.
In this work we propose a novel framework to estimate the unobservable model
primitives for systems in equilibrium. Our data-driven approach hinges on the fact
that although the model primitives may be unobservable, it is frequently possible
to observe equilibria experimentally. We use these observed equilibria to estimate
the original primitives.
We draw on an example from game theory to illustrate. Typically, one specifies
the utility functions for each player in a game and then calculates Nash equilibria.
In practice, however, it is essentially impossible to observe utilities directly. Worse,
the specific choice of utility function often makes a substantial difference in the
resulting equilibrium. Our approach amounts to estimating a player’s utility func-
tion from her actions in previous games, assuming her actions were approximately
equilibria with respect to her opponents. In contrast to her utility function, her
previous actions are directly observable. This utility function can be used either
to predict her actions in future games, or as an input to subsequent mechanism
design problems involving this player in the future.
A second example comes from transportation science. Given a particular road
network, one typically specifies a cost function and then calculates the resulting
flow under user (Wardrop) equilibrium. However, measuring the cost function
directly in a large-scale network is challenging because of the interdependencies
among arcs. Furthermore, errors in estimates of cost functions can have severe and
counterintuitive effects; Braess paradox (see [13]) is one well-known example. Our
approach amounts to estimating cost functions using current traffic count data
(flows) on the network, assuming those flows are approximately in equilibrium.
Again, in contrast to the cost function, traffic count data are readily observable
and frequently collected on many real-life networks. Finally, our estimate can be
used either to predict congestion on the network in the future, or else to inform
subsequent network design problems.
In general, we focus on equilibria that can be modeled as the solution to a
variational inequality (VI). VIs are a natural tool for describing equilibria with
examples spanning economics, transportation science, physics, differential equa-
tions, and optimization. (See Section 2.1 or [26] for detailed examples.) Our model
centers on solving an inverse variational inequality problem: given data that we be-
lieve are equilibria, i.e., solutions to some VI, estimate the function which describes
this VI, i.e., the model primitives.
Our formulation and analysis is motivated in many ways by the inverse opti-
mization literature. In inverse optimization, one is given a candidate solution to an
optimization problem and seeks to characterize the cost function or other problem
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data that would make that solution (approximately) optimal. See [27] for a survey
of inverse combinatorial optimization problems, [3] for the case of linear optimiza-
tion and [28] for the case of conic optimization. The critical difference, however,
is that we seek a cost function that would make the observed data equilibria, not
optimal solutions to an optimization problem. In general, optimization problems
can be reformulated as variational inequalities (see Sec. 2.1), so that our inverse
VI problem generalizes inverse optimization, but this generalization allows us to
address a variety of new applications.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider inverse variational
inequality problems. Previous work, however, has examined the problem of esti-
mating parameters for systems assumed to be in equilibrium, most notably the
structural estimation literature in econometrics and operations management ([36],
[5], [4], [33]). Although there are a myriad of techniques collectively referred to
as structural estimation, roughly speaking, they entail (1) assuming a parametric
model for the system including probabilistic assumptions on random quantities,
(2) deducing a set of necessary (structural) equations for unknown parameters,
and, finally, (3) solving a constrained optimization problem corresponding to a
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimate for the parameters. The con-
straints of this optimization problem include the structural equations and possibly
other application-specific constraints, e.g., orthogonality conditions of instrumen-
tal variables. Moreover, this optimization problem is typically difficult to solve
numerically, as it is can be non-convex with large flat regions and multiple local
optima (see [4] for some discussion).
Our approach differs from structural estimation and other specialized ap-
proaches in a number of respects. From a philosophical point of view, the most
critical difference is in the objective of the methodology. Specifically, in the struc-
tural estimation paradigm, one posits a “ground-truth” model of a system with a
known parametric form. The objective of the method is to learn the parameters in
order to provide insight into the system. By contrast, in our paradigm, we make
no assumptions (parametric or nonparametric) about the true mechanics of the
system; we treat is as a “black-box.” Our objective is to fit a model – in fact, a VI
– that can be used to predict the behavior of the system. We make no claim that
this fitted model accurately reflects “reality,” merely that it has good predictive
power.
This distinction is subtle, mirroring the distinction between “data-modelling”
in classical statistics and “algorithmic modeling” in machine learning. (A famous,
albeit partisaned, account of this distinction is [15].) Our approach is kindred to
the machine learning point of view. For a more detailed discussion, please see
Appendix B.
This philosophical difference has a number of practical consequences:
1. Minimal Probabilistic Assumptions: Our method has provably good perfor-
mance in a very general setting with minimal assumptions on the underlying
mechanism generating the data. (See Theorems 6-8 for precise statements.)
By contrast, other statistical methods, including structural estimation, require
a full-specification of the data generating mechanism and can yield spurious
results if this specification is inaccurate.
2. Tractability: Since our fitted model need not correspond exactly to the un-
derlying system dynamics, we have considerably more flexibility in choosing its
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functional form. For several interesting choices, including nonparametric speci-
fications (see next point), the resulting inverse VI problem can be reformulated
as a conic optimization problem. Conic optimization problems are both theo-
retically and numerically tractable, even for large scale instances ([12]), in sharp
contrast to the non-convex problems that frequently arise in other methods.
3. Nonparametric Estimation: Like existing methods in inverse optimization
and structural estimation, our approach can be applied in a parametric set-
ting. Unlike these approaches, our approach also extends naturally to a non-
parametric description of the function f defining the VI. To the best of our
knowledge, existing methods do not treat this possibility. Partial exceptions
are [8] and [25] which use nonparametric estimators for probability densities,
but parametric descriptions of the mechanism governing the system. The key
to our nonparametric approach is to leverage kernel methods from statistical
learning to reformulate the infinite dimensional inverse variational inequality
problem as a finite dimensional, convex quadratic optimization problem. In
applications where we may not know, or be willing to specify a particular form
for f we consider this non-parametric approach particularly attractive.
Although there are other technical differences between these approaches – for
example, some structural estimation techniques can handle discrete features while
our method applies only to continuous problems – we feel that the most impor-
tant difference is the aforementioned intended purpose of the methodology. We
see our approach as complementary to existing structural estimation techniques
and believe in some applications practitioners may prefer it for its computational
tractability and relatively fewer modeling assumptions. Of course, in applications
where the underlying assumptions of structural estimations or other statistical
techniques are valid, those techniques may yield potentially stronger claims about
the underlying system.
We summarize our contributions below:
1. We propose the inverse variational inequality problem to model inverse equi-
librium. We illustrate the approach by estimating market demand functions
under Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and by estimating the congestion function
in a traffic equilibrium.
2. We formulate an optimization problem to solve a parametric version of the
inverse variational inequality problem. The complexity of this optimization
depends on the particular parametric form of the function to be estimated. We
show that for several interesting choices of parametric form, the parametric
version of the inverse variational inequality problem can be reformulated as a
simple conic optimization problem.
3. We formulate and solve a nonparametric version of the inverse variational
inequality problem using kernel methods. We show that this problem can be
efficiently solved as a convex quadratic optimization problem whose size scales
linearly with the number of observations.
4. Under very mild assumptions on the mechanism generating the data, we show
that both our parametric and non-parametric formulations enjoy a strong gen-
eralization guarantee similar to the guarantee enjoyed by other methods in
machine learning. Namely, if the fitted VI explains the existing data well, it
will continue to explain new data well. Moreover, under some additional as-
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sumptions on the optimization problem, equilibria from the VI serve as good
predictions for new data points.
5. We provide computational evidence in the previous two examples – demand
estimation under Nash equilibrium and congestion function estimation under
traffic equilibrium – that our proposed approach recovers reasonable functions
with good generalization properties and predictive power. We believe these
results may merit independent interest in the specialized literature for these
two applications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews back-
ground material on equilibrium modeling through VIs. Section 3 formally defines
the inverse variational inequality problem and solves it in the case that the func-
tion to be estimated has a known parametric form. In preparation for the non-
parametric case, Section 4 reviews some necessary background material on kernels.
Section 5 formulates and solves the nonparametric inverse variational inequality
problem using kernels, and Section 6 illustrates how to incorporate priors, semi-
parametric modeling and ambiguity sets into this framework. Section 7 states our
results on the generalization guarantees and predictive power of our approach.
Finally, Section 8 presents some computational results, and Section 9 concludes.
In the interest of space, almost all proofs are placed in the Appendix.
In what follows we will use boldfaced capital letters ( e.g., A,W) to denote
matrices, boldfaced lowercase letters (e.g., x, f(·)) to denote vectors or vector-
valued functions, and ordinary lowercase letters to denote scalars. We will use
caligraphic capital letters (e.g., S) to denote sets. For any proper cone C, i.e. C
is pointed, closed, convex and has a strict interior, we will say x ≤C y whenever
y − x ∈ C.
2 Variational Inequalities: Background
2.1 Definitions and Examples
In this section, we briefly review some results on variational inequalities that we
use in the remainder of the paper. For a more complete survey, see [26].
Given a function f : Rn → Rn and a non-empty set F ⊆ Rn the variational
inequality problem, denoted VI(f ,F), is to find an x∗ ∈ F such that
f(x∗)T (x− x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ F . (1)
A solution x∗ to VI(f ,F) need not exist, and when it exists, it need not be unique.
We can guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the solution by making appro-
priate assumptions on f(·) and/or F , e.g., f continuous and F convex and compact.
See [26] for other less stringent conditions.
There are at least three classical applications of VI modeling that we will refer
to throughout the paper: constrained optimization, Nash Equilibrium, and Traffic
(or Market) Equilibrium.
Constrained Optimization. The simplest example of a VI is in fact not an equi-
librium, per se, but rather convex optimization. Nonetheless, the specific example
is very useful in building intuition about VIs. Moreover, using this formalism, one
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can derive many of the existing results in the inverse optimization literature as a
special case of our results for inverse VIs in Section 3.2.
Consider the problem
min
x∈F
F (x). (2)
The first order necessary conditions for an optimal solution of this problem are
(see, e.g., [11])
∇F (x∗)T (x− x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ F . (3)
These conditions are sufficient in the case that F is a convex function and F is a
convex set. Observe, then, that solving (2) is equivalent to finding a point which
satisfies Eq. (3), which is equivalent to solving VI(∇F,F).
Note that, in general, a VI with a function f whose Jacobian is symmetric
models an optimization problem (see [26]).
Nash Equilibrium. Our first application of VI to model equilibrium is non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. Consider a game with p players. Each player i
chooses an action from a set of feasible actions, ai ∈ Ai ⊆ Rmi , and receives a
utility Ui(a1, . . . ,ap). Notice in particular, that player i’s payoff may depend upon
the actions of other players. We will assume that Ui is differentiable and concave
in ai for all i and that Ai is convex for all i.
A profile of actions for the players (a∗1,a∗2, . . .a∗p) is said to be a Nash Equilib-
rium if no single player can unilaterally change her action and increase her utility.
See [22] for a more complete treatment. In other words, player i plays her best
response given the actions of the other players. More formally,
a∗i ∈ arg max
a∈Ai
Ui(a
∗
1, . . . ,a
∗
i−1,a,a
∗
i+1, . . . ,a
∗
p), i = 1, . . . , p. (4)
This condition can be expressed as a VI. Specifically, a profile a∗ = (a∗1,a∗2, . . .a∗p)
is a Nash Equilibrium, if and only if it solves VI(f ,F) where F = A1×A2×· · ·×Ap,
f(a) =
−∇1U1(a)...
−∇pUp(a)
 (5)
and ∇i denotes the gradient with respect to the variables ai (see [26] for a proof.)
It is worth pointing out that many authors use Eq. (4) to conclude
∇iUi(a∗1, . . . ,a∗p) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p, (6)
where ∇i refers to a gradient with respect to the coordinates of ai. This charac-
terization assumes that each player’s best response lies on the strict interior of her
strategy set Ai. The assumption is often valid, usually because the strategy sets
are unconstrained. Indeed, this condition can be derived as a special case of (5)
in the case Ai = Rmi . In some games, however, it is not clear that an equilibrium
must occur in the interior, and we must use (5) instead. We will see an example
in Sec. 3.2.
Wardrop Equilibrium. Our final example of a VI is Wardrop or user-equilibrium
from transportation science. Wardrop equilibrium is extremely close in spirit to
the market (Walrasian) equilibrium model in economics – see [19], [42] – and our
comments below naturally extend to the Walrasian case.
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Specifically, we are given a directed network of nodes and arcs (V,A), rep-
resenting the road network of some city. Let N ∈ {0, 1}|V|×|A| be the node-arc
incidence matrix of this network. For certain pairs of nodes w = (ws, wt) ∈ W, we
are also given an amount of flow dw that must flow from ws to wt. The pair w is
referred to as an origin-destination pair. Let dw ∈ R|V | be the vector which is all
zeros, except for a (−dw) in the coordinate corresponding to node ws and a (dw)
in the coordinate corresponding to node wt.
We will say that a vector of flows x ∈ R|A|+ is feasible if x ∈ F where
F =
{
x : ∃xw ∈ R|A|+ s.t. x =
∑
w∈W
xw, Nxw = dw ∀w ∈ W
}
.
Let ca : R|A|+ → R+ be the “cost” function for arc a ∈ A. The interpretation
of cost, here, is deliberately vague. The cost function might represent the actual
time it takes to travel an arc, tolls users incur along that arc, disutility from
environmental factors along that arc, or some combination of the above. Note
that because of interdependencies in the network, the cost of traveling arc a may
depend not only on xa, but on the flows on other arcs as well. Denote by c(·) the
vector-valued function whose a-th component is ca(·).
A feasible flow x∗ is a Wardrop equilibrium if for every origin-destination pair
w ∈ W , and any path connecting (ws, wt) with positive flow in x∗, the cost of
traveling along that path is less than or equal to the cost of traveling along any
other path that connects (ws, wt). Here, the cost of traveling along a path is the
sum of the costs of each of its constituent arcs. Intuitively, a Wardrop equilibrium
captures the idea that if there exists a less congested route connecting ws and wt,
users would find and use it instead of their current route.
It is well-known that a Wardrop equilibrium is a solution to VI(c,F).
2.2 Approximate Equilibria
Let  > 0. We will say that xˆ ∈ F is an -approximate solution to VI(f ,F) if
f(xˆ)T (x− xˆ) ≥ −, ∀x ∈ F . (7)
This notion of an approximate solution is not new to the VI literature– it corre-
sponds exactly to the condition that the primal gap function of the VI is bounded
above by  and is frequently used in the analysis of numerical procedures for
solving the VI. We point out that -approximate solutions also frequently have a
modeling interpretation. For example, consider the case of constrained convex op-
timization (cf. Eq. (2)). Let x∗ be an optimal solution. Since F is convex, we have
F (xˆ) − F (x∗) ≤ −∇F (xˆ)T (x∗ − xˆ) ≤ . In other words, -approximate solutions
to VIs generalize the idea of -optimal solutions to convex optimization problems.
Similarly, in a Nash equilibrium, an -approximate solution to the VI (5) describes
the situation where each player i does not necessarily play her best response given
what the other players are doing, but plays a strategy which is no worse than 
from her best response.
The idea of -approximate solutions is not the only notion of an approximate
equilibrium. An alternative notion of approximation is that ‖xˆ − x∗‖ ≤ δ where
8 D. Berstimas, V. Gupta & I. Ch. Paschalidis
x∗ is a solution to the VI(f ,F). We say such a xˆ ∈ F is δ-near a solution to
the VI(f ,F). As shown in Theorem 1, these two ideas are closely related. The
theorem was proven in [34] to provide stopping criteria for certain types of iterative
algorithms for solving VIs. We reinterpret it here in the context of approximate
equilibria.
Before stating the theorem, we define strong monotonicity. We will say that
f(·) is strongly monotone if ∃γ > 0 such that
(f(x)− f(y))T (x− y) ≥ γ‖x− y‖2 ∀x,y ∈ F .
When the VI corresponds to constrained optimization (cf. Eqs. (2), (3)), strong
monotonicity of f corresponds to strong convexity of F . Intuitively, strong mono-
tonicity ensures that f does not have large, flat regions.
Theorem 1 ([34]) Suppose f is strongly monotone with parameter γ. Then every
-approximate solution to VI(f ,F) is
√

γ -near an exact solution.
We require Theorem 1 in Section 7 to prove some of our generalization results.
2.3 Characterizing Approximate Solutions to VIs over Conic Representable Sets
In this section we provide an alternative characterization of an -approximate
solution (cf. Eq. (7)) in the case when F is represented by the intersection of conic
inequalities.
Specifically, for the remainder of the paper, we will assume:
Assumption 1 F can be represented as the intersection of a small number of
conic inequalities in standard form, F = {x : Ax = b,x ∈ C}.
Assumption 2 F satisfies a Slater-condition
The assumption that F is given in standard form is not crucial. All of our results
extend to the case that F is not given in standard form at the expense of some
notation. It is, however, crucial, that F is conic representable. Observe that when
C is the nonnegative orthant, we recover the special case where F is a polyhedron.
With other choices of C, e.g., the second-order cone, we can model more complex
sets, such as intersection of ellipsoids. To stress the dependence on A,b, C, we will
write VI(f ,A,b, C).
The following result was first proven in [2] to describe a reformulation of
VI(f ,A,b, C) as a single-level optimization problem. We reinterpret here as a char-
acterization of approximate equilibria and sketch a short proof for completeness.
Theorem 2 ([2]) Under assumptions A1, A2, the solution xˆ is an -approximate
equilibrium to VI(f ,A,b, C) if and only if ∃y s.t.
ATy ≤C f(xˆ), (8)
f(xˆ)T xˆ− bTy ≤ . (9)
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Proof First suppose that xˆ is an -approximate equilibrium. Then, from Eq. (7),
f(xˆ)T xˆ−  ≤ f(xˆ)Tx, ∀x ∈ F ,
which is equivalent to f(xˆ)T xˆ−  ≤ minx∈F f(xˆ)Tx. The right hand side is a conic
optimization problem in x, and the above shows it is bounded below. Since F has
non-empty interior, strong duality holds (see [12]), which implies that there exists
a dual solution y that attains the optimum. In other words,
min
x∈F
f(xˆ)Tx = max
y:ATy≤C f(xˆ)
bTy.
Substituting this dual solution into the above inequality and rearranging terms
yields the result. The reverse direction is proven analogously using weak conic
duality. uunionsq
The above proof leverages the fact that the duality gap between an optimal pri-
mal and dual solution pair is zero. We can instead formulate a slightly different
characterization by leveraging complementary slackness. In this case, Eq. (9) is
replaced by the additional constraints
n∑
i=1
xi(fi(xˆ)− yTAei) ≤ . (10)
Depending on the application, either the strong duality representation (cf. Eqs.
(8), (9)) or the complementary slackness representation (cf. Eqs. (8), (10) may be
more natural. We will use the strong duality formulation in Section 8.3 and the
the complementary slackness formulation in Section 8.1.
3 The Inverse Variational Inequality Problem
3.1 Problem Formulation
We are now in a position to pose the inverse variational inequality problem. We
are given observations (xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj) for j = 1, . . . , N . In this context, we modify
Assumption A2 to read
Assumption The set Fj = {x ∈ Rn : Ajx = bj ,x ∈ Cj} is non-empty and satisfies
a Slater condition for each j.
This is not a particularly stringent condition; given data that does not satisfy it,
we can always pre-process the data ensure it does satisfy this assumption.
We seek a function f such that xj is an approximate solution to VI(f ,Aj ,bj , Cj)
for each j. Note, the function f is common to all observations. Specifically, we would
like to solve:
min
f ,
‖‖
s.t. xj is an j-approximate solution to VI(f ,Aj ,bj , Cj), j = 1, . . . , N, (11)
f ∈ S.
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where ‖ · ‖ represents some choice of norm, and S represents the set of admissible
functions. In the parametric case, treated in the following section, we will assume
that S is indexed by a vector of parameters θ ∈ Θ ⊆ RM . In the nonparametric
case, S will be a general set of functions that satisfy certain smoothness properties.
We defer this extension until Section 5.
3.2 Parametric Estimation:
In this section, we assume that the function f is known to belong to a parametric
family indexed by a vector θ ∈ Θ. We write f(x;θ) to denote this dependence. We
will assume throughout that Θ is compact and f(x;θ) is continuous in θ. A direct
application of Theorem 2 yields the following reformulation:
Theorem 3 Under assumptions 1, 2 and the additional constraint that f = f(x;θ)
for some θ ∈ Θ, problem Eq. (11) can be reformulated as
min
θ∈Θ,y,
‖‖ (12)
s.t. ATj yj ≤C f(xj ;θ), j = 1, . . . N,
f(xj ;θ)
Txj − bTj yj ≤ j , j = 1, . . . , N,
where y = (y1, . . . ,yN ).
Remark 1 (Multiple equilibria) We stress that since Theorem 2 is true for any -
approximate solution to the VI, Theorem 3 is valid even when the function f might
give rise to multiple distinct equilibria. This robustness to multiple equilibria is
an important strength of our approach that distinguishes it from other specialized
approaches that require uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Remark 2 (Equilibria on the boundary) In Theorem 2, we did not need to assume
that the xj or the solutions to V I(f ,Aj ,bj) belonged to the interior of Fj . Con-
sequently, Theorem 3 is valid even if the observations xj or induced solutions to
V I(f ,Aj ,bj) occur on the boundary. This is in contrast to many other techniques
which require that the solutions occur on the relative interior of the feasible set.
Remark 3 (Computational complexity) Observe that xj are data in Problem (12),
not decision variables. Consequently, the complexity of this optimization depends
on the cone C and the dependence of f on θ, but not on the dependence of f on
x. For a number of interesting parametric forms, we can show that Problem (12)
is in fact tractable.
As an example, suppose f(x;θ) =
∑M
i=1 θiφi(x) where φ1(x), . . . ,φM (x) is a
set of (nonlinear) basis functions. Since f depends linearly on θ, Problem (12) is a
conic optimization problem, even though the basis functions φi(x) may be arbitrary
nonlinear functions. Indeed, if C is the nonnegative orthant, Problem (12) is a
linear optimization problem. Similarly, if C is the second-order cone, Problem (12)
is a second-order cone problem.
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Finally, although structural estimation is not the focus of our paper, in Ap-
pendix B we briefly illustrate how to use Theorem 2 to formulate an alternate
optimization problem that is similar to, but different from, Problem (12) and
closer in spirit to structural estimation techniques. Moreover, we show that this
formulation is equivalent to certain structural estimation techniques in the sense
that they produce the same estimators. This section may prove useful to readers
interested in comparing these methodology.
3.3 Application: Demand Estimation under Bertrand-Nash Competition
In this section, we use Theorem 3 to estimate an unknown demand function for a
product so that observed prices are approximately in Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
This is a somewhat stylized example inspired by various influential works in the
econometrics literature, such as [9] and [10]. We include this styled example for
two reasons: 1) To illustrate a simple problem where equilibria may occur on the
boundary of the feasible region. 2) To further clarify how the choice of parameter-
ization of f(·;θ) affects the computational complexity of the estimation problem.
For simplicity, consider two firms competing by setting prices p1, p2, respec-
tively. Demand for firm i’s product, denoted Di(p1, p2, ξ), is a function of both
prices, and other economic indicators, such as GDP, denoted by ξ. Each firm sets
prices to maximize its own revenues Ui(p1, p2, ξ) = piDi(p1, p2, ξ) subject to the
constraint 0 ≤ pi ≤ p. The upper bound p might be interpreted as a government
regulation as is frequent in some markets for public goods, like electricity. We
assume a priori that each demand function belongs to some given parametric fam-
ily indexed by (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ: D1(p1, p2, ξ;θ1), D2(p1, p2, ξ;θ2). We seek to estimate
θ1,θ2 ∈ Θ so that the data (pj1, pj2, ξ) for j = 1, . . . , N correspond approximately
to Nash equilibria.
Both [9] and [10] assume that equilibrium prices do not occur on the boundary,
i.e., that pi < p since they leverage Eq. (6) in their analysis. These methods are,
thus, not directly applicable.
By contrast, Theorem 3 directly applies yielding (after some arithmetic)
min
y,
(θ1,θ2)∈Θ
‖‖
s.t. yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N, (13)
yji ≥ pji
∂
∂pi
Di(p
j
1, p
j
2, ξ
j ;θi) +Di(p
j
1, p
j
2, ξ
j ;θi), i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , N,
2∑
i=1
pjyji − (pji )2
∂
∂pi
Di(p
j
1, p
j
2, ξ
j ;θi)− pjiDi(pj1, pj2, ξj ;θi) ≤ j , j = 1, . . . , N.
We stress that potentially more complex constraints on the feasible region can be
incorporated just as easily.
Next, recall that the complexity of the optimization problem (13) depends on
the parameterization of Di(p1, p2, ξ,θi). For example, when demand is linear,
Di(p1, p2, ξ;θi) = θi0 + θi1p1 + θi2p2 + θi3ξ (14)
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problem (13) reduces to the linear optimization problem:
min
y,,(θ1,θ2)∈Θ,d
‖‖
s.t. yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N,
yji ≥ dji + θiipji , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , N,
p
2∑
i=1
yji − pjidji − (pji )2θii ≤ j , j = 1, . . . , N, (15)
dji = θi0 + θi1p
j
1 + θi2p
j
2 + θi3ξ
j , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , N.
Alternatively, if we assume demand is given by the multinomial logit model [23],
Di(p1, p2, ξ;θ) =
eθi0+θi1pi+θi3ξ
eθ10+θ11p1+θ13ξ+eθ20+θ21p2+θ23ξ+θ00
, the problem (13) becomes
min
y,,θ1,θ2,d1,d2
‖‖
s.t. yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N,
yji ≥ pji θi1dj1dj2 + dji , i = 1, 2,
2∑
i=1
pjyji + p
j
id
j
i − (pji )2θ1idji (1− dji ) ≤ j
dji =
eθ0i+θi1p
j
i+θi3ξ
j
eθ10+θ11p
j
1+θ13ξ
j
+ eθ20+θ21p
j
2+θ23ξ + θ00
, i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . N,
which is non-convex. Non-convex optimization problems can be challenging nu-
merically and may scale poorly.
Finally, we point out that although it more common in the econometrics lit-
erature to specify the demand functions Di directly as we have above, one could
equivalently specify the marginal revenue functions
Mi(p1, p2, ξ;θi) = pi∂iDi(p1, p2, ξ;θi) +Di(p1, p2, ξ;θi)
and then impute the demand function as necessary. We adopt this equivalent
approach later in Section 8.1.
4 Kernel Methods: Background
Intuitively, our nonparametric approach in the next section seeks the “smoothest”
function f which make the observed data approximate equilibria, where the precise
notion of smoothness is determined by the choice of kernel. Kernel methods have
been used extensively in machine learning, most recently for feature extraction in
context of support-vector machines or principal component analysis. Our use of
kernels, however, more closely resembles their application in spline interpolation
and regularization networks ([40], [24]).
Our goal in this section is to develop a sufficiently rich set of scalar valued func-
tions over which we can tractably optimize using kernel methods. Consequently, we
first develop some background. Our review is not comprehensive. A more thorough
treatment of kernel methods can be found in either [37], [39] or [21].
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Let F ⊆ Rn denote some domain. Let k : F ×F → R be a symmetric function.
We will say that k is a kernel if k is positive semidefinite over F , i.e., if
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cicjk(xi,xj) ≥ 0 for any choice of N ∈ N, c ∈ RN , xi ∈ F .
Examples of kernels over Rn include:
Linear: k(x,y) ≡ xTy,
Polynomial: k(x,y) ≡ (c+ xTy)d for some choice of c ≥ 0 and d ∈ N,
Gaussian: k(x,y) ≡ exp(−c‖x− y‖2) for some choice of c > 0.
Let kx(·) ≡ k(x, ·) denote the function of one variable obtained by fixing the
first argument of k to x for any x ∈ F . Define H0 to be the vector space of scalar
valued functions which are representable as finite linear combinations of elements
kx for some x ∈ F , i.e.,
H0 =

N∑
j=1
αjkxj : xj ∈ F , N ∈ N, αj ∈ R, j = 1, . . . , N,N ∈ N
 . (16)
Observe that kx ∈ H0 for all x ∈ F , so that in a sense these elements form a basis
of the space H0. On the other hand, for a given f ∈ H0, its representation in terms
of these elements kxj for xj ∈ F need not be unique. In this sense, the elements
kx are not like a basis.
For any f, g ∈ H0 such that
f =
N∑
j=1
αjkxj , g =
N∑
i=1
βikxi , α,β ∈ RN (17)
we define a scalar product
〈f, g〉H0 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αiβj〈kxi , kxj 〉H0 ≡
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αiβjk(xi,xj). (18)
Since the representation in (17) is not unique, for this to be a valid definition
one must prove that the right-hand side of the last equality is independent of the
choice of representation. It is possible to do so. See [37] for the details. Finally,
given this scalar-product, we define the norm ‖f‖H0 ≡
√
〈f, f〉H0 .
In what follows, we will actually be interested in the closure of H0, i.e.,
H = H0. (19)
We extend the scalar product 〈·, ·〉H0 and norm ‖ · ‖H0 to H by continuity. (Again,
see [37] for the details). Working with H instead of H0 simplifies many results.1
As an example, in the case of the linear and polynomial kernels, the space H is
finite dimensional and corresponds to the space of linear functions and the space
of polynomials of degree at most d, respectively. In the case of the Gaussian kernel,
the space H is infinite dimensional and is a subspace of all continuous functions.
1 For the avoidance of doubt, the closure in (19) is with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖H0 .
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If f ∈ H0 admits a finite representation as in Eq.(17), note that from Eq. (18)
we have for all x ∈ F
〈kx, f〉H =
N∑
j=1
αjk(x,xj) = f(x). (20)
In fact, it can be shown that this property applies to all f ∈ H ([31]). This is the
most fundamental property of H as it allows us to relate the scalar product of the
space to function evaluation. Eq. (20) is termed the reproducing property and as a
consequence, H is called a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS).
At this point, it may appear that RKHS are very restrictive spaces of functions.
In fact, it can be shown that any Hilbert space of scalar-valued functions for which
there exists a c ∈ R such that for each f ∈ H, |f(x)| ≤ c‖f‖H for all x ∈ F is an
RKHS ([31]). Thus, RKHS are fairly general. Practically speaking, though, our
three previous examples of kernels –linear, polynomial, and Gaussian –are by far
the most common in the literature.
We conclude this section with a discussion about the norm ‖f‖H. We claim
that in each of our previous examples, the norm ‖f‖H makes precise a different
notion of “smoothness” of the function f . For example, it is not hard to see that
if f(x) = wTx, then under the linear kernel ‖f‖H = ‖w‖. Thus, functions with
small norm have small gradients and are “smooth” in the sense that they do not
change value rapidly in a small neighborhood.
Similarly, it can be shown (see [24]) that under the Gaussian kernel,
‖f‖2H = 1(2pi)n
∫
|f˜(ω)|2e
‖ω‖2
2c dω, (21)
where f˜ is the Fourier transformation of f . Thus, functions with small norms do
not have many high-frequency Fourier coefficients and are “smooth” in the sense
that they do not oscillate very quickly.
The case of the polynomial kernel is somewhat more involved as there does
not exist a simple explicit expression for the norm (see [24]). However, it is easily
confirmed numerically using Eq. (18) that functions with small norms do not
have large coefficients and do not have have high degree. Consequently, they are
“smooth” in the sense that their derivatives do not change value rapidly in a small
neighborhood.
Although the above reasoning is somewhat heuristic, it is possible to make the
intuition that the norm on an RKHS describes a notion of smoothness completely
formal. The theoretical details go beyond the scope of this paper (see [24]). For
our purposes, an intuitive appreciation that the H-norm penalizes non-smooth
functions and that the particular notion of smoothness is defined by the kernel
will be sufficient for the remainder.
5 The Inverse Variational Inequality Problem: A Nonparametric Approach
5.1 Kernel Based Formulation
In this section, we develop a nonparametric approach to the inverse variational
inequality problem. The principal difficulty in formulating a nonparametric equiv-
alent to (11) is that the problem is ill-posed. Specifically, if the set S is sufficiently
Data-Driven Estimation in Equilibrium 15
rich, we expect there to be many, potentially infinitely many, different functions f
which all reconcile the data, and make each observation an exact equilibrium. In-
tuitively, this multiplicity of solutions is similar to the case of interpolation where,
given a small set of points, many different functions will interpolate between them
exactly. Which function, then, is the “right” one?
We propose to select the function f of minimal H-norm among those that
approximately reconcile the data. This choice has several advantages. First, as
mentioned earlier, functions with small norm are “smooth”, where the precise
definition of smoothness will be determined by the choice of kernel. We feel that
in many applications, assuming that the function defining a VI is smooth is very
natural. Second, as we shall prove, identifying the function f with minimal norm is
computationally tractable, even when the RKHS H is infinite dimensional. Finally,
as we will show in Section 7, functions with bounded H-norm will have good
generalization properties.
Using Theorem 2, we reformulate Problem (11) as
min
f ,y,
n∑
i=1
‖fi‖2H
s.t. ATj yj ≤ f(xj), j = 1, . . . , N, (22a)
xTj f(xj)− bTj yj ≤ j , j = 1, . . . , N, (22b)
‖‖ ≤ κ,  ≥ 0, fi ∈ H, i = 1, . . . , n,
1
N
N∑
j=1
xTj f(xj) = 1. (22c)
Here fi is the i-th component of the vector function f and H is an RKHS. Since
we may always scale the function f in VI(f ,F) by a positive constant without
affecting the solution, we require the last constraint as a normalization condition.
Finally, the exogenous parameter κ allows us to balance the norm of f against how
closely f reconciles the data; decreasing κ will make the observed data closer to
equilibria at the price of f having greater norm.
Problem (22) is an optimization over functions, and it is not obvious how
to solve it. We show in the next theorem, however, that this can be done in a
tractable way. This theorem is an extension of a representation theorem from the
kernel literature (see [40]) to the constrained multivariate case. See the appendix
for a proof.
Theorem 4 Suppose Problem (22) is feasible. Then, there exists an optimal solution
f∗ = (f∗1 , . . . , f∗n) with the following form:
f∗i =
N∑
j=1
αi,jkxj , (23)
for some αi,j ∈ R, where k denotes the kernel of H.
By definition of H, when Problem (22) is feasible, its solution is a potentially
infinite expansion in terms of the kernel function evaluated at various points of
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F . The importance of Theorem 4 is that it allows us to conclude, first, that this
expansion is in fact finite, and second, that the relevant points of evaluation are
exactly the data points xj . This fact further allows us to replace the optimization
problem (22), which is over an infinite dimensional space, with an optimization
problem over a finite dimensional space.
Theorem 5 Problem (22) is feasible if and only if the following optimization problem
is feasible:
min
α,y,
n∑
i=1
eTi αKα
T ei
s.t. Ajyj ≤ αKej j = 1, . . . , N,
xTj αKej − bTj yj ≤ j j = 1, . . . , N,
‖‖ ≤ κ,  ≥ 0, (24)
1
N
N∑
j=1
xTj αKej = 1.
Here α = (αij)
i=n,j=N
i=1,j=1 ∈ Rn×N , and K = (k(xi,xj))i,j=Ni,j=1 . Moreover, given an opti-
mal solution α to the above optimization problem, an optimal solution to Problem (22)
is given by Eq. (23).
See the appendix for a proof. Given the optimal parameters α, f can be evaluated
at new points t using (23). Note that K is positive semidefinite (as a matrix)
since k is positive definite (as a function). Thus, (24) is a convex, quadratic opti-
mization problem. Such optimization problems are very tractable numerically and
theoretically, even for large-scale instances. (See [12]). Moreover, this quadratic
optimization problem exhibits block structure – only the variables αj couple the
subproblems defined by the yj — which can be further exploited in large-scale
instances. Finally, the size of this optimization scales with N , the number of ob-
servations, not with the dimension of the original space H, which may be infinite.
Observe that Problem (22) is bounded, but may be infeasible. We claim it will
be feasible whenever κ is sufficiently large. Indeed, let fˆi ∈ H be any functions
from the RKHS. By scaling, we can always ensure (22c) is satisfied. The following
convex optimization minx:Ajx=bj ,x≥0 fˆ(xj)
Tx is bounded and satisfies a Slater
condition by Assumption A2. Let yˆj be the dual variables to this optimization,
so that yˆj satisfy (22a) and define ˆj according to (22b). Then as long as κ ≥
‖ˆ‖, Problem (22), and consequently Problem (24), will be feasible and obtain an
optimal solution.
Computationally, treating the possible infeasibility of (24) can be cumbersome,
so in what follows, we find it more convenient to dualize this constraint so that
the objective becomes,
min
α,y
αTKα+ λ‖‖, (25)
and then solve this problem for various choices of λ > 0. Note this version of the
problem is always feasible, and, indeed, we will employ this formulation later in
Sec. 8.
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We conclude this section by contrasting our parametric and nonparametric
formulations. Unlike the parametric approach, the nonparametric approach is al-
ways a convex optimization problem. This highlights a key tradeoff in the two ap-
proaches. The parametric approach offers us fine-grained control over the specific
form of the function f at the potential expense of the tractability of the optimiza-
tion. The nonparametric approach offers less control but is more tractable.
We next illustrate our nonparametric approach below with an example.
5.2 Application: Estimating the Cost Function in Wardrop Equilibrium.
Recall the example of Wardrop equilibrium from Section 2.1. In practice, while
the network (V,A) is readily observable, the demands dw and cost function ca(·)
must be estimated. Although several techniques already exist for estimating the
demands dw ([1], [41]), there are fewer approaches for estimating ca(·). Those
techniques that do exist often use stylized networks, e.g., one origin-destination
pair, to build insights. See [32] for a maximum likelihood approach, and [35] for
kinematic wave analyses.
By contrast, we focus on estimating ca(·) from observed flows or traffic counts
on real, large scale networks. Specifically, we assume we are given networks (Vj ,Aj),
j = 1, . . . , N , and have access to estimated demands on these networks dwj for all
wj ∈Wj . In practice, this may be the same network observed at different times of
day, or different times of year, causing each observation to have different demands.
In the transportation literature, one typically assumes that ca(·) only depends
on arc a, and in fact, can be written in the form ca(xa) = c0ag
(
xa
ma
)
, for some
nondecreasing function g. The constant c0a is sometimes called the free-flow travel
time of the arc, and ma is the effective capacity of the arc. These constants are
computed from particular characteristics of the arc, such as its length, the number
of lanes or the posted speed limit. (Note the capacity ma is not a hard constraint;
it not unusual to see arcs where x∗a > ma in equilibrium.) We will also assume this
form for the cost function, and seek to estimate the function g(·).
Using (24) and (25) we obtain the quadratic optimization problem
min
α,y,
αTKα+ λ‖‖ (26)
s.t. eTaN
T
j y
w ≤ c0aαTKea, ∀w ∈Wj , a ∈ Aj , j = 1, . . . , N,
αTKea ≤ αTKea′ , ∀a, a′ ∈ A0 s.t. xama ≤
xa′
ma′
, (27)∑
a∈Aj
c0axaα
TKea −
∑
w∈Wj
(dw)Tyw ≤ j , , ∀w ∈Wj , j = 1, . . . , N,
αTKea0 = 1.
In the above formulation A0 is a subset of
⋃N
j=1Aj and K ∈ R
∑N
j=1 |Aj |×
∑N
j=1 |Aj |.
Constraint (27) enforces that the function g(·) be non-decreasing on these arcs.
Finally, a0 is some (arbitrary) arc chosen to normalize the function.
Notice, the above optimization can be quite large. If the various networks are
of similar size, the problem has O(N(|A1|+ |W1||V1|) variables and O(N |W1||A1|+
|A0|) constraints. As mentioned previously, however, this optimization exhibits
significant structure. First, for many choices of kernel, the matrix K is typically
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(approximately) low-rank. Thus, it is usually possible to reformulate the optimiza-
tion in a much lower dimensional space. At the same time, for a fixed value of α,
the optimization decouples by w ∈Wj and j. Each of these subproblems, in turn,
is a shortest path problem which can be solved very efficiently, even for large-scale
networks. Thus, combining an appropriate transformation of variables with block
decomposition, we can solve fairly large instances of this problem. We take this
approach in Section 8.3.
6 Extensions
Before proceeding, we note that Theorem 4 actually holds in a more general setting.
Specifically, a minimization over an RKHS will admit a solution of the form (23)
whenever
a) the optimization only depends on the norms of the components ‖fi‖H and the
function evaluated at a finite set of points f(xj), and
b) the objective is nondecreasing in the norms ‖fi‖H.
The proof is identical to the one presented above, and we omit it for conciseness.
An important consequence is that we can leverage the finite representation of
Theorem 4 in a number of other estimation problems and to facilitate inference.
In this section, we describe some of these extensions.
6.1 Incorporating Priors and Semi-Parametric Estimation
Suppose we believe a priori that the function f describing the VI should be close
to a particular function f0 (a prior). In other words, f = f0 + g for some function
g which we believe is small. We might then solve
min
g,y,
n∑
i=1
‖gi‖2H
s.t. ATj yj ≤ f0(xj) + g(xj) j = 1, . . . , N,
xTj (f0(xj) + g(xj))− bTj yj ≤ j j = 1, . . . , N,
‖‖ ≤ κ,  ≥ 0, gi ∈ H, i = 1, . . . , n.
From our previous remarks, it follows that this optimization is equivalent to
min
α,y,
n∑
i=1
eTi αKα
T ei
s.t. Ajyj ≤ f0(xj) +αKej j = 1, . . . , N
xTj (f0(xj) +αKej)− bTj yj ≤ j j = 1, . . . , N,
‖‖ ≤ κ,  ≥ 0,
which is still a convex quadratic optimization problem.
In a similar way we can handle semi-parametric variants where f decomposes
into the sum of two functions, one of which is known to belong to a parametric
family and the other of which is defined nonparmetrically, i.e., f(·) = f0(·;θ) + g
for some θ and g ∈ Hn.
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Remark 4 (A Challenge with Partial Derivatives) There are natural modeling cir-
cumstances where Theorem 4 is not applicable. For example, recall in our demand
estimation example from Section 3.3 that the inverse variational inequality prob-
lem depends not only on the demand functions D1(·), D2(·) evaluated at a finite
set of points (pj1, p
j
2), but also on their partial derivatives at those points. Intu-
itively, the partial derivative ∂iDi(p
j
1, p
j
2) requires information about the function
in a small neighborhood of (pj1, p
j
2), not just at the point, itself. Consequently,
Theorem 4 is not applicable. Extending the above techniques to this case remains
an open area of research.
6.2 Ambiguity sets
In many applications, there may be multiple distinct models which all reconcile
the data equally well. Breiman termed this phenomenon the “Rashomon” effect.
It can occur even with parametric models that are well-identified, since there may
exist models outside the parametric family which will also reconcile the data.
Consequently, we would often like to identify the range of functions which may
explain our data, and how much they differ.
We can determine this range by computing the upper and lower envelopes of
the set of all functions within an RKHS that make the observed data approxi-
mate equilibria. We call this set the ambiguity set for the estimator. To construct
these upper and lower bounds on the ambiguity set, consider fixing the value of
κ in (22) and replacing the objective by fi(xˆ) for some xˆ ∈ F . This optimization
problem satisfies the two conditions listed at the beginning of this section. Con-
sequently, Theorem 4 applies, and we can use the finite representation to rewrite
the optimization problem as a linear optimization problem in α,y. Using software
for linear optimization, it is possible to generate lower and upper bounds on the
function f(xˆ) for various choices of xˆ quickly and efficiently.
To what value should we set the constant κ? One possibility is to let κ be the
optimal objective value of (12) , or a small multiple of it. This choice of κ yields the
set of functions which “best” reconcile the given data. We discuss an alternative
approach in Section 7 that yields a set of functions which are statistically similar
to the current estimator.
Regardless of how we choose, κ, though, ambiguity sets can be combined with
our previous parametric formulations to assess the appropriateness of the par-
ticular choice of parametric family. Indeed, the ambiguity set formed from the
nonparametric kernel contains a set of alternatives to our parametric form which
are, in some sense, equally plausible from the data. If these alternatives have signif-
icantly different behavior from our parametric choice, we should exercise caution
when interpreting the fitted function.
Can we ever resolve the Rashomon effect? In some cases, we can use application-
specific knowledge to identify a unique choice. In other cases, we need appeal to
some extra, a priori criterion. A typical approach in machine learning is to focus
on a choice with good generalizability properties. In the next section, we show
that our proposed estimators enjoy such properties.
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7 Generalization Guarantees
In this section, we seek to prove generalization guarantees on the estimators from
Problem (12) and (22). Proving various types of generalization guarantees for
various algorithms is a central problem in machine learning. These guarantees
ensure that the performance of our estimator on new, future data will be similar
to its observed performance on existing data.
We impose a mild assumption on the generating process which is common
throughout the machine learning literature:
Assumption 3 The data (xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj) are i.i.d. realizations of random variables
(x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜) drawn from some probability measure P.
Notice, we make no assumptions on potential dependence between (x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜), nor
do we need to know the precise form of P. We also assume
Assumption 4 The random set F˜ = {x : A˜x = b˜,x ∈ C˜} satisfies a Slater Condi-
tion almost surely.
Assumption 5 x˜ ∈ F˜ almost surely.
Assumptions 4 and 5 are not particularly stringent. If these condition may fail,
we can consider pre-processing the data so that they succeed, and then consider
a new measure Q induced by this processing of P.
We now prove a bound for a special case of Problem (12). Let zN ,θN denote
the optimal value and optimal solution of (12). If for some N , there exist multiple
optimal solutions, choose θN by some tie-breaking rule, e.g., the optimal solution
with minimal `2-norm. For any 0 < α < 1, define
β(α) ≡
dim(θ)∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
αi(1− α)N−i.
Theorem 6 Consider Problem (12) where the norm ‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖∞. Suppose that
this problem is convex in θ and that Assumptions A1, A3-A5 hold. Then, for any
0 < α < 1, with probability at least 1− β(α) with respect to the sampling,
P
(
x˜ is a zN -approximate equilibrium for VI(f(·,θN ), A˜, b˜, C˜)
) ≥ 1− α.
The proof relies on relating Problem (12) to an uncertain convex program [18],
and leveraging results on the randomized counterparts of such programs. See the
appendix for the details.
Remark 5 There are two probability measures in the theorem. The first (explicit)
is the probability measure of the new data point (x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜). The second (implicit)
is the probability measure of the random quantities zN , θN . One way to interpret
the theorem is as follows: One can ask, “For a fixed pair zN ,θN , is the probability
that xN+1 is a zN -approximate equilibrium for VI(f(·,θN ),AN+1,bN+1, CN+1)
with respect to the first measure at least 1− α?” The theorem asserts the answer
is, “Yes” with probability at least 1 − β(α) with respect to the second measure.
More loosely, the theorem asserts that for “typical” values of zN ,θN , the answer
is “yes.” This type of generalization result, i.e., a result which is conditional on
the data-sampling measure, is typical in machine learning.
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Remark 6 Notice that β(α) corresponds to the tail probability of a binomial dis-
tribution, and, hence, converges exponentially fast in N .
Remark 7 (`1 Regularization) The value β(α) depends strongly on the dimension
of θ. In [17], the authors show that including an `1 regularization of the form
‖θ‖1 to reduce the effective dimension of θ can significantly improve the above
bound in the context of uncertain convex programs.2 Motivated by this idea, we
propose modifying our original procedure by including a regularization λ‖θ‖1 in
the objective of Problem (12). Since the problem is convex this formulation is
equivalent to including a constraint of the form ‖θ‖1 ≤ κ for some value of κ that
implicitly depends on λ, and, consequently, Theorem 6 still applies but with zN
redefined to exclude the contribution of the regularization to the objective value.
Unfortunately, the proof of Theorem 6 doesn’t generalize easily to other prob-
lems, such as other norms or Problem (22). A more general approach to proving
generalization bounds is based upon Rademacher complexity. Rademacher com-
plexity is a popular measure of the complexity of a class of functions, related to
the perhaps better known VC-bounds. Loosely speaking, for function classes with
small Rademacher complexity, empirical averages of functions in the class converge
to their true expectation uniformly over the class, and there exist bounds on the
rate of convergence which are tight up to constant factors. We refer the reader to
[7] for a formal treatment.
We will use bounds based upon the Rademacher complexity of an appropri-
ate class of functions to prove generalization bounds for both our parametric and
nonparametric approaches. In the case of our nonparametric approach, however,
it will prove easier to analyze the following optimization problem instead of Prob-
lem (22):
min
f ,y,
‖‖pp
N
s.t. ATj yj ≤ f(xj), j = 1, . . . , N,
xTj f(xj)− bTj yj ≤ j , j = 1, . . . , N, (28)
‖fi‖2H ≤ κi, fi ∈ H, i = 1, . . . , n,
1
N
N∑
j=1
xTj f(xj) = 1,
for some fixed p, 1 ≤ p <∞. We have made two alterations from Problem (22) with
the dualized objective (25). First, using Lagrangian duality, we have moved the
term λ
∑n
i=1 ‖fi‖H from the objective to the constraints. Indeed, for any value of
λ, there exists values κi so that these two problems are equivalent. Second, we have
specialized the choice of norm to a p-norm, and then made an increasing trans-
formation of the objective. If we can show that solutions to Problem (28) enjoy
strong generalization guarantees, Problem (22) should satisfy similar guarantees.
Now, introduce
2 In fact, the authors show more: they give an algorithm leveraging `1 regularization to
reduce the dimensionality of θ and then an improved bound based on the reduced dimension.
The analysis of this improved bound can be adapted to our current context at the expense of
more notation. We omit the details for space.
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Assumption 6 The set F˜ is contained within a ball of radius R almost surely.
Next, we introduce some additional notation. Consider Problem (12). Define
2 sup
x:‖x‖2≤R
θ∈Θ
‖f(x;θ)‖2 ≡ B. (29)
Observe B < ∞. Let fN = f(·;θN ) denote the function corresponding to the
optimal solution of Problem (12). With a slight abuse of language, we call fN a
solution to Problem (12).
We define analogous quantities for Problem (28). Given a kernel k(·, ·), let
K
2 ≡ supx:‖x‖2≤R k(x,x). Notice, if k is continuous, K is finite by A6. For example,
K
2
=

R2 for the linear kernel
(c+R2)d for the polynomial kernel
1 for the Gaussian kernel
(30)
With a slight abuse of notation, let zN , fN denote the optimal value and an optimal
solution to Problem (28), and let B ≡ 2RK
√∑n
i=1 κ
2
i . This mild abuse of notation
allows us to express our results in a unified manner. It will be clear from context
whether we are treating Problem (12) or Problem (28), and consequently be clear
which definition of fN , B we mean.
Finally, define (fN , x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜) to be the smallest  ≥ 0 such that x˜ is an -
approximate solution to VI(fN , A˜, b˜, C˜).
Theorem 7 Let zN , fN be the optimal objective and an optimal solution to Prob-
lem (12) or (28). Assume A1, A3-A6. For any 0 < β < 1, with probability at least
1− β with respect to the sampling,
i)
E[((fN , x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜))p] ≤ zN + 1√
N
(
4pB
p
+ 2B
p/2√
2 log(2/β)
)
. (31)
ii) For any α > 0,
P(x˜ is a zN+α-approximate equilibrium for VI(fN , A˜, b˜, C˜))
≥ 1− 1
αp
√
N
(
4pB
p
+ 2B
p/2√
2 log(2/β)
)
.
Remark 8 To build some intuition, consider the case p = 1. The quantity zN is the
average error on the data set for fN . The theorem shows with high-probability, fN
will make a new data point an -approximate equilibrium, where  is only O(1/
√
N)
larger than zN . In other words, the fitted function will perform not much worse
than the average error on the old data. Note, this does not guarantee that zN is
small. Indeed, zN will only be small if in fact a VI is a good model for the system.
Remark 9 (Specifying Ambiguity Sets) We can use Theorem 7 to motivate an alter-
nate proposal for specifying κ in ambiguity sets as in Section 6. Specifically, let
RN denote the second term on the righthand side of (31). Given another feasible
function f ′ in Problem (28) whose objective value is strictly greater than zN +RN ,
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we can claim that with probability at least 1 − β, fN has a smaller expected ap-
proximation error than f ′. However, if the objective value of f ′ is smaller than
zN + RN , we cannot reject it at level 1 − β; it is statistically as plausible as fN .
Setting κ = RN in our ambiguity set recovers all such “statistically plausible”
functions.
Theorems 6 and 7 provide a guarantee on the generalization error of our
method. We may also be interested in its predictive power. Namely, given a new
point (xN+1,AN+1,bN+1, CN+1), let xˆ be a solution to VI(fN ,AN+1,bN+1, CN+1))
The value xˆ is a prediction of the state of a system described by (AN+1,bN+1, CN+1)
using our fitted function and xN+1 represents true state of that system. We have
the following theorem:
Theorem 8 Assume fN is strongly monotone with parameter γ.
i) Suppose the conditions of Theorem 6 hold. Then, for any 0 < α < 1, with probability
at least 1− β(α) with respect to the sampling,
‖xN+1 − xˆ‖ ≤
√
zN
γ
.
ii) Suppose the conditions of Theorem 7 hold. Then, for any 0 < β < 1, with probability
at least 1− β with respect to the sampling, for any α > 0
P
(
‖xN+1 − xˆ‖ >
√
zN + α
γ
)
≤ 1
αp
√
N
(
4pB
p
+ 2B
p/2√
2 log(2/β)
)
.
In words, Theorem 8 asserts that solutions to our VI using our fitted function
serve as good predictions to future data realizations. This is an important strength
of our approach as it allows us to predict future behavior of the system. Again,
this is contingent on the fact that zN is small, i.e., that the VI well-explains the
current data.
We conclude this section by noting that experimental evidence from machine
learning suggests that bounds such as those above based on Rademacher com-
plexity can be loose in small-samples. The recommended remedy is that, when
computationally feasible, to use a more numerically intensive method like cross-
validation or bootstrapping to estimate approximation and prediction errors. This
approach applies equally well to choosing parameters like the threshold in an am-
biguity set κ as described in Remark 9. We employ both approaches in Section 8.
8 Computational Experiments
In this section, we provide some computational experiments illustrating our ap-
proach. For concreteness, we focus on our two previous examples: estimating the
demand function in Bertrand-Nash equilibrium from Sec. 3.3 and estimating cost
functions in traffic equilibrium from Sec. 5.2.
Before providing the details of the experiments, we summarize our major in-
sights.
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1. In settings where there are potentially many distinct functions that explain the
data equally well, our nonparametric ambiguity sets are able to identify this
set of functions. By contrast, parametric methods may misleadingly suggest
there is only one possible function.
2. Even in the presence of endogenous, correlated noise, our parametric and non-
parametric techniques are able to learn functions with good generalizability,
even if the specified class does not contain the true function generating the
data.
3. Sometimes, the functions obtained by our method are not strongly monotone.
Nonetheless, they frequently still have reasonable predictive power.
8.1 Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium (Full-Information)
We first consider an idealized, full-information setting to illustrate the importance
of our ambiguity set technique. Specifically, we assume the true, demand functions
are given by the nonlinear model
D∗i (p1, p2, ξi) = log(pi) + θ
∗
i1p1 + θ
∗
i2p2 + θ
∗
i3ξi + θ
∗
i4, i = 1, 2
with θ∗1 = [−1.2, .5, 1,−9]T and θ∗2 = [.3,−1, 1,−9]T . We assume (for now) that
although we know the parametric form of these demand functions, we do not know
the precise values of θ1,θ2 and seek to estimate them. The corresponding marginal
revenue functions are
M∗i (p1, p2, ξi;θ
∗
i ) = log(pi) + θ
∗
i1p1 + θ
∗
i2p2 + θ
∗
i3ξi + θ
∗
i4 + 1 + θ
∗
iipi, i = 1, 2. (32)
Here ξ1, ξ2 are random variables representing firm-specific knowledge which change
over time (“demand shocks”) causing prices to shift.
Our idealized assumption is that ξ1 = ξ2 ≡ ξ, and ξ is common knowledge
to both the firms and to the researcher (full-information). In our simulations, we
take ξ to be i.i.d normals with mean 5 and standard deviation 1.5. Using these
parameters with p = .45, we simulate values of ξ and solve for the equilibrium
prices pj1, p
j
2 for j = 1, . . . , 250. The values (ξ
j , pj1, p
j
2) constitute our data set.
To estimate θ1,θ2, we substitute the functional form Eq. (32) into Prob-
lem (13), adding additional constraints that 1) the marginal revenue of firm i
is positive for the minimal price pji observed in the data, 2) the marginal revenue
of firm i is decreasing in firm i’s price, and 3) a normalization constraint. (See
Appendix C.1 for an explicit formulation).
Unsurprisingly, solving this optimization recovers the true marginal revenue
functions exactly. We say “unsurprisingly” because with full-information a cor-
rectly specified, known parametric form, we believe any reasonable estimation
procedure should recover the true marginal revenue functions. We point out that
the optimal solution to the optimization problem is unique, and the optimal value
of the residuals is  = 0
We plot the true marginal revenue functions for each firm (which is the same
as our fitted function) in Figure 1 (dashed black line). To graph these functions
we fixed ξ to be its median value over the dataset, and fixed the other firm’s price
to be the price observed for this median value. For convenience in what follows,
we term this type of fixing of the other variables, fixing to the median observation.
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Fig. 1 An idealized scenario. The true marginal revenue function (dashed black line), our
nonparametric fit (black line, square markers), and the ambiguity set (grey region) for both
firms. Every function in the ambiguity set exactly reconciles all the data. A sample member
(blue line, triangle markers) shown for comparison. All variables other than the firm’s own
price have been fixed to the median observation.
Next consider the more realistic setting where we do not know the true para-
metric form (32), and so use our nonparametric method (cf. Problem 22 with
dualized objective (25)). We use a Gaussian kernel and tune the parameter c and
regularization constant λ by 10-fold cross-validation. The resulting fitted function
is shown in Figure 1 as a black line with square markers. Notice, in particular,
this function does not coincide with the true function. However, this function also
exactly reconciles the data, i.e. the optimal value of the residuals is  = 0. This
may seem surprising; the issue is that although there is only one function within
the parametric family (32) which reconciles the data, there are many potential
smooth, nonparametric functions which also exactly reconcile this data. Using our
ambiguity set technique, we compute the upper and lower envelopes of this set of
functions, and display the corresponding region as the grey ribbon in Figure 1. We
also plot a sample function from this set (blue line with triangle markers).
This multiplicity phenomenon is not unusual; many inverse problems share
it. Moreover, it often persists even for very large samples N . In this particular
case, the crux of the issue is that, intuitively, the equilibrium conditions only
give local information about the revenue function about its minimum. (Notice all
three marginal revenue functions cross zero at the same price). The conditions
themselves give no information about the global behavior of the function, even as
N →∞.
We see our ambiguity set technique and nonparametric analysis as important
tools to protect against potentially faulty inference in these settings. Indeed, para-
metric estimation might have incorrectly led us to believe that the unique marginal
revenue function which recovered the data was the dashed line in Figure 1 – its
residual error is zero and it is well-identified within the class. We might then have
been tempted to make claims about the slope of the marginal revenue function
at the optima, or use it to impute a particular functional form for the demand
function. In reality, however, any function from the ambiguity set might have
just as easily generated this data , e.g., the blue line with triangle markers. Those
previous claims about the slope or demand function, then, need not hold. The data
does not support them. Calculating nonparametric sets of plausible alternatives
helps guard against these types of unwarranted claims.
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Finally, in the absence of any other information, we argue that our proposed
nonparametric fit (red line with circles) is a reasonable candidate function in this
space of alternatives. By construction it will be smooth and well-behaved. More
generally, of all those functions which reconcile the data, it has the smallest H-
norm, and thus, by our generalization results in Section 7, likely has the strongest
generalization properties.
8.2 Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium (Unobserved Effects)
We now proceed to a more realistic example. Specifically, we no longer assume
that ξ1 = ξ2, but rather these values represent (potentially different), firm-specific
knowledge that is unobservable to us (the researchers). We assume instead that
we only have access to the noisy proxy ξ. In our simulations, we take ξ1, ξ2, ξ
′ to be
i.i.d normal with mean 5 and standard deviation 1.5, and let ξ = (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ
′)/3.
Moreover, we assume that we we have incorrectly specified that the marginal
revenue functions are of the form
Mi(p1, p2, ξ;θi) =
9∑
k=1
θi1ke
−kp1 +
9∑
k=1
θi2ke
−kp2 + θi1p1 + θi2p2 + θi3ξ3 + θi4 (33)
for some values of θ1,θ2. Notice that the true parametric is not contained in
this class. This setup thus includes correlated noise, and endogenous effect, and
parametric mispecification. These features are known to cause statistical challenges
in simple estimation procedures. We simulate N = 40 observations (ξj , pj1, p
j
2) from
this model.
We again fit this model first by solving a modification of Problem (13) as
before. (See Appendix C.1 for an explicit formulation). We only use half the day
(20 observations) for reasons that will become clear momentarily. We use the `∞-
norm for the residuals  and an `1-regularization of θ1,θ2 in the objective as
discussed in Remark 7. We tune the value of λ in the regularization to minimize
the mean squared error in price prediction obtaining the value λ = .01.
Unfortunately, because we used cross-validation to choose λ, Theorem 6 does
not directly apply. Consequently, we now refit θ1,θ2 with λ = .1 using the other
half of our training set. The fitted marginal revenue functions for λ = .01 can be
seen in Figure 2 (red line, circular markers). Notice that the fitted function does
not exactly recover the original function, but does recover its approximate shape.
To assess the out of sample performance of this model, we generate a new set of
Nout = 200 points. For each point we compute the approximation error (minimal
 to make this point an -approximate equilbria), and the prediction error had we
attempted to predict this point by the solution to our VI with our fitted function.
Histograms of both quantities are in Fig. 3.
The maximal residual on the second half of the training set was zN ≈ 1.06,
indicated by the dotted line in the left panel. By Theorem 6, we would expect
that with at least 90% probability with respect to the data sampling, a new point
would not be an 1.06-equilibrium with probability at most .21. Our out-of-sample
estimate of this probability is .025. In other words, our estimator has much stronger
generalization than predicted by our theorem. At the same time, our estimator
yields reasonably good predictions. The mean out-of-sample prediction error is
(−.002, 0.02) with standard deviation (.048, .047).
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Fig. 2 The true marginal revenue function (dashed line), fitted parametric marginal revenue
function (solid red line, circular markers), fitted non-parametric marginal revenue function
(solid black line, square markers)and ambiguity sets (grey region) for each firm. We fix all
variables except the firm’s own price to the median observation.
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Fig. 3 Bertrand-Nash example of Section 8.2. The left panel shows the out-of-sample ap-
proximation error. The right panel shows the out-of-sample prediction error.
Finally, we fit our a nonparametric estimator to this data, using a Gaussian
kernel. We again tune the parameter c and regularization constant λ by cross-
validation. The resulting fit is shown in Figure 2 (black line, square markers),
along with the corresponding ambiguity set. We chose the value of κ to be twice the
standard deviation of the `1-norm of the residuals, estimated by cross-validation
as discussed in Remark 9 and the end of Sec. 7. The out-of-sample approximation
error is similar to the parametric case. Unfortunately, the fitted function is not
monotone, and, consequently, there exist multiple Nash equilibria. It is thus hard
to compare prediction error on the out-of-sample set; which equilibria should we
use to predict? This non-monotonicity is a potential weakness of the nonparametric
approach in this example.
8.3 Wardrop Equilibrium
Our experiments will use the Sioux Falls network [30], a standard benchmark
throughout the transportation literature. It is modestly sized with 24 nodes and
76 arcs, and all pairs of nodes represent origin-destination pairs.
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Fig. 4 The left panel shows the true BPR function and fits based on polynomials of degrees
3, 4, 5, and 6. The right panel shows the true BPR function (dashed line), our degree 3 fit
(solid black line with markers), and an ambiguity set around this function (grey region).
We assume that the true function g(·) is given by the U.S. Bureau of Public
Roads (BPR) function, g(t) = 1 + .15t4 which is by far the most commonly used
for traffic modeling ([14], [16]). Baseline demand levels, arc capacities, and free-
flow travel times were taken from the repository of traffic problems at [6]. We
consider the network structure including arc capacities and free-flow travel times as
fixed. We generate data on this network by first randomly perturbing the demand
levels a relative amount drawn uniformly from [0, 10%]. We then use the BPR
function to solve for the equilibrium flows on each arc, x∗a. Finally, we perturb
these true flows by a relative amount, again drawn uniformly from [0, 10%]. We
repeat this process N = 40 times. Notice that because both errors are computed
as relative perturbations, they both are correlated to the observed values. We use
the perturbed demands and flows as our data set.
We then fit the function g nonparametrically using (26), again only using half
of the data set. The use of low order polynomials in traffic modeling is preferred
in the literature for a number of computational reasons. Consequently, we choose
k to be a polynomial kernel with degree at most 6, and tune the choice of c by 5-
fold cross-validation, minimizing the approximation error. The fitted functions for
various choices of d are shown in left panel of Figure 4, alongside the true function.
Notice that the fit is quite stable to choice of class of function, and matches the
true function very closely. In what remains, we focus on our fit of polynomial of
degree 3. We note, this class does not contain the true BPR function (which has
degree 4). We refit the degree 3 polynomial with the second-half of our training
set (not shown).
To assess the quality of our degree 3 fit, we create a new out-of-sample test-set
of size Nout = 500. On each sample we compute the approximation error of our fit
and the `2-norm of the prediction error when predicting new flows by solving the
fitted VI. These numbers are large and somewhat hard to interpret. Consequently
we also compute normalized quantities, normalizing the first by the minimal cost
of travel on that network with respect to the fitted function and demands, and
the second by the `2 norm of the observed flows. Histograms for the normalized
quantities are shown in Figure 5. The mean (relative) approximation error is 6.5%,
while the mean predictive (relative error) is about 5.5%.
The in-sample approximation error on the second-half of the training sample
was zN ≈ 8.14×105. By Theorem 7, we can compute that with probability at least
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Fig. 5 The left panel shows the histogram of of out-sample approximation errors induced by
our nonparametric fit from Section 8.3. The right panel shows the norm of the difference of
this flow from the observed flow, relative to the norm of the observed flow.
90% with respect to the data sampling, a new data point will be at most a 9.73×105
approximate equilibrium with respect to the fitted function with probability at
least 90%. A cross-validation estimate of the same quantity is 6.24× 105. Our out
of sample estimate of this quantity from the above histogram is 7.78 × 105. In
other words, the performance of our estimator is again better than predicted by
the theorem. Cross-validation provides a slightly better, albeit biased, bound.
Finally, as in the previous section, we consider constructing an ambiguity set
around the fitted function, selecting κ to be two standard deviations as computed
by cross-validation. The resulting envelopes are also shown in the right panel of
Figure 4. Notice that in contrast to the envelopes of the previous section, they are
quite small, meaning we can have relatively high confidence in the shape of the
fitted function.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a computationally tractable technique for estimation in
equilibrium based on an inverse variational inequality formulation. Our approach
is generally applicable and focuses on fitting models with good generalization guar-
antees and predictive power. We prove our estimators enjoy both properties and
illustrate their usage in two applications – demand estimation under Nash equi-
librium and congestion function estimation under user equilibrium . Our results
suggest this technique can successfully model systems presumed to be in equilib-
rium and make meaningful predictive claims about them.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof Let f∗ = (f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
n) be any solution. We will construct a new solution with potentially
lower cost with the required representation. We do this iteratively beginning with f∗1 .
Consider the subspace T ⊂ H1 defined by T = span(kx1 , . . . , kxN ), and let T ⊥ be its
orthogonal complement. It follows that f∗1 decomposes uniquely into f
∗
1 = f0 + f
⊥
0 with
f0 ∈ T and f⊥0 ∈ T ⊥. Consequently,
f∗1 (xj) = 〈kxj , f∗1 〉, (by (20))
= 〈kxj , f0〉+ 〈kxj , f⊥0 〉
= 〈kxj , f0〉 (since f⊥0 ∈ T ⊥)
= f0(xj) (by (20)).
Thus, the solution f = (f0, f∗2 , . . . , f
∗
n) is feasible to (22). Furthermore, by orthogonality
‖f∗1 ‖H1 = ‖f0‖H1 + ‖f⊥0 ‖H1 ≥ ‖f0‖H1 . Since the objective is non-decreasing in ‖f1‖H, f
has an objective value which is no worse than f∗. We can now proceed iteratively, consider-
ing each coordinate in turn. After at most n steps, we have constructed a solution with the
required representation. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof Suppose Problem (24) is feasible and let α be a feasible solution. Define f via eq. (23).
It is straightforward to check that f is feasible in Problem (22) with the same objective value.
On the other hand, let f be some feasible solution to Problem (22). By Theorem 4, there
exists α such that fi(xj) = e
T
i αKej , and ‖fi‖2H = eTi αKαT ei. It straightforward to check
that such α is feasible in Problem (24) and that they yield the same objective value. Thus,
Problem (22) is feasible if and only if Problem (24) is feasible, and we can construct an optimal
solution to Problem (22) from an optimal solution to Problem (24) via (23). uunionsq
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof As mentioned in the text, the key idea in the proof is to relate (12) with a randomized
uncertain convex program. To this end, notice that if zN ,θN are an optimal solution to (12)
with the `∞-norm, then (zN ,θN ) ∈
⋂N
j=1 X (xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj) where
X (x,A,b, C) =
{
z,θ ∈ Θ : ∃y ∈ Rm s.t. ATy ≤ f(x,θ), xT f(x,θ)− bTy ≤ z
}
.
The sets X (xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj) are convex. Consider then the problem
min
z≥0,θ
z s.t. (z,θ) ∈
N⋂
j=1
X (xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj).
This is exactly of the form Eq. 2.1 in [18]. Applying Theorem 2.4 of that work shows that
with probability β(α) with respect to the sampling, the “violation probability” of the pair
(zN , θN ) is a most α. In our context, the probability of violation is exactly the probability
that (x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜) is not a zN approximate equilibria. This proves the theorem.
Observe that the original proof in [18] requires that the solution θN be unique almost surely.
However, as mentioned on pg. 7 discussion point 5 of that text, it suffices to pick a tie-breaking
rule for the θN in the case of multiple solutions. The tie-breaking rule discussed in the main
text is one possible example.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 7
We require auxiliary results. Our treatment closely follows [7]. Let ζ1, . . . , ζN be i.i.d. For any
class of functions S, define the empirical Rademacher complexity RN (S) by
RN (S) = E
[
sup
f∈S
2
N
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
σif(ζi)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ζ1, . . . , ζN
]
,
where σi are independent uniform {±1}-valued random variables. Notice this quantity is ran-
dom, because it depends on the data ζ1, . . . , ζN .
Our interest in Rademacher complexity stems from the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let S be a class of functions whose range is contained in [0,M ]. Then, for any N ,
and any 0 < β < 1, with probability at least 1−β with respect to P, every f ∈ F simultaneously
satisfies
E[f(ζ)] ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
f(ζi) +RN (S) +
√
8M log(2/β)
N
(34)
Proof The result follows by specializing Theorem 8 of [7]. Namely, using the notation of that
work, let φ(y, a) = L(y, a) = a/M , δ = β and then apply the theorem. Multiply the re-
sulting inequality by M and use Theorem 12, part 3 of the same work to conclude that
MRN (M−1S) = RN (S) to finish the proof.
Remark 10 The constants in the above lemma are not tight. Indeed, modifying the proof of
Theorem 8 in [7] to exclude the centering of φ to φ˜, one can reduce the constant 8 in the above
bound to 2. For simplicity in what follows, we will not be concerned with improvements at
constant order.
Remark 11 Lemma 1 relates the empirical expectation of a function to its true expectation.
If f ∈ S were fixed a priori, stronger statements can be proven more simply by invoking the
weak law of large numbers. The importance of Lemma 1 is that it asserts the inequality holds
uniformly for all f ∈ S. This is important since in what follows, we will be identifying the
relevant function f by an optimization, and hence it will not be known to us a priori, but will
instead depend on the data.
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Our goal is to use Lemma 1 to bound the E[(fN , x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜)]. To do so, we must compute an
upper-bound on the Rademacher complexity of a suitable class of functions. As a preliminary
step,
Lemma 2 For any f which is feasible in (12) or (28), we have
˜(f , x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜) ≤ B a.s. (35)
Proof Using strong duality as in Theorem 2,
˜(f , x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜) = max
x∈F˜
(x˜− x)T f(x˜) ≤ 2R sup
x˜∈F˜
‖f(x˜)‖2, (36)
by A6. For Problem (12), the result follows from the definition of B. For Problem (28), observe
that for any x˜ ∈ F˜ ,
|fi(x˜)|2 = 〈fi, kx˜〉2 ≤ ‖fi‖2H sup‖x‖2≤R
k(x,x) = ‖fi‖2HK
2 ≤ κ2iK2, (37)
where the middle inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwartz. Plugging this into Eq. (36) and
using the definition of B yields the result.
Now consider the class of functions
F =

{
(x,A,b, C) 7→ (f ,x,A,b, C) : f = f(·,θ),θ ∈ Θ
}
for Problem (12){
(x,A,b, C) 7→ (f ,x,A,b, C) : fi ∈ H, ‖fi‖H ≤ κi i = 1, . . . , N
}
for Problem (28).
Lemma 3
RN (F ) ≤ 2B√
N
Proof We prove the lemma for Problem (12). The proof in the other case is identical. Let
S = {f(·,θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. Then,
RN (F ) = 2
N
E
sup
f∈S
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
σj(xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj)Nj=1

≤ 2B
N
E[(
N∑
j=1
σ2j )
1
2 ] (using (35))
≤ 2B
N
√√√√E[ N∑
j=1
σ2j ] (Jensen’s inequality)
=
2B√
N
(σ2j = 1 a.s.).
We are now in a position to prove the theorem.
Proof (Theorem 7 ) Observe that zN =
1
N
∑N
j=1((fN ,xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj))
p. Next, the function
φ(z) = zp satisfies φ(0) = 0 and is Lipschitz with constant Lφ = pB
p−1
on the interval [0, B].
Consequently, from Theorem 12 part 4 of [7],
RN (φ ◦ F ) ≤ 2LφRN (F )
≤ 2pBp−1 2B√
N
=
4pB
p
√
N
.
Now applying Lemma 1 with ζ → (x˜, A˜, b˜, C˜), f(·)→ (·)p, and M = Bp yields the first part
of the theorem.
For the second part of the theorem, observe that, conditional on the sample, the event x˜
is not a zN + α-approximate equilibrium is equivalent to the event that N > zN + α. Now
use Markov’s inequality and apply the first part of the theorem.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof Consider the first part of the theorem.
By construction, xˆ solves VI(f(·, θN ),AN+1,bN+1, CN+1). The theorem, then, claims
that xN+1 is δ
′ ≡
√
zN
γ
near a solution to this VI. From Theorem 1, if xN+1 were not δ
′
near a solution, then it must be the case that (f(·, θN ),xN+1,AN+1,bN+1, CN+1) > zN . By
Theorem 6, this happens only with probability β(α).
The second part is similar to the first with Theorem 6 replaced by Theorem 7.
B Casting Structural Estimation as an Inverse Variational Inequality
In the spirit of structural estimation, assume there exists a true θ∗ ∈ Θ that generates solutions
x∗j to VI(f(·, θ∗),A∗j ,b∗j , C∗j ). We observe (xj ,Aj ,bj , Cj) which are noisy versions of these
true parameters. We additionally are given a precise mechanism for the noise, e.g., that
xj = x
∗
j +∆xj , Aj = A
∗
j +∆Aj , bj = b
∗
j +∆bj , Cj = C
∗
j ,
where (∆xj ,∆Aj ,∆bj) are i.i.d. realizations of a random vector (∆˜x, ∆˜A, ∆˜b) and ∆˜x, ∆˜A, ∆˜b
are mutually uncorrelated.
We use Theorem 2 to estimate θ under these assumptions by solving
min
y≥0,θ∈Θ,∆x,∆A,∆b
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ∆˜xj˜∆Ak
˜∆bj

j=1,...,N
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
s.t. (Aj −∆Aj)Tyj ≤Cj f(xj −∆xj ,θ), j = 1, . . . , N,
(xj −∆xj)T f(xj −∆xj ,θ) = bTj yj , j = 1, . . . , N, (38)
where ‖·‖ refers to some norm. Notice this formulation also supports the case where potentially
some of the components of x are unobserved; simply replace them as optimization variables in
the above. In words, this formulation assumes that the “de-noised” data constitute a perfect
equilibrium with respect to the fitted θ.
We next claim that if we assume all equilibria occur on the strict interior of the feasible
region, Problem (38) is equivalent to a least-squares approximate solution to the equations
f(x∗) = 0. Specifically, when x∗ occurs on the interior of F , the VI condition Eq. (1) is
equivalent to the equations f(x∗) = 0. At the same time, by Theorem 2, Eq. (1) is equivalent
to the system (8), (9) with  = 0 which motivated the constraints in Problem (38). Thus,
Problem (38) is equivalent to finding a minimal (with respect to the given norm) perturbation
which satisfies the structural equations.
We can relate this weighted least-squares problem to some structural estimation tech-
niques. Indeed, [20] and [38] observed that many structural estimation techniques can be
reinterpreted as a constrained optimization problem which minimizes the size of the perturba-
tion necessary to make the observed data satisfy the structural equations, and, additionally,
satisfy constraints motivated by orthogonality conditions and the generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM). In light of our previous comments, if we augment Problem (38) with the same
orthogonality constraints, and all equilibria occur on the strict interior of the feasible region,
the solutions to this problem will coincide traditional estimators.
Of course, some structural estimation techniques incorporate even more sophisticated
adaptations. They may also pre-process the data (e.g., 2 stage least squares technique in
econometrics) incorporate additional constraints (e.g. orthogonality of instruments approach),
or tune the choice of norm in the least-squares computation (two-stage GMM estimation).
These application-specific adaptations improve the statistical properties of the estimator given
certain assumptions about the data generating process. What we would like to stress is that,
provided we make the same adaptations to Problem (38) – i.e., preprocess the data, incorporate
orthogonality of instruments, and tune the choice of norm – and provided that all equilibria
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occur on the interior, the solution to Problem (38) must coincide exactly with these techniques.
Thus, they necessarily inherit all of the same statistical properties.
Recasting (at least some) structural estimation techniques in our framework facilitates a
number of comparisons to our proposed approach based on Problem (12). First, it is clear how
our perspective on data alters the formulation. Problem (38) seeks minimal perturbations so
that the observed data are exact equilibria with respect to θ, while Problem (12) seeks a θ that
makes the observed data approximate equilibria and minimizes the size of the approximation.
Secondly, the complexity of the proposed optimization problems differs greatly. The complexity
of Problem (38) depends on the dependence of f on x and θ (as opposed to just θ for (12)),
and there are unavoidable non-convex, bilinear terms like ∆ATj yj . These terms are well-known
to cause difficulties for numerical solvers. Thus, we expect that solving this optimization to
be significantly more difficult than solving Problem (12). Finally, as we will see in the next
section, Problem (12) generalizes naturally to a nonparametric setting.
C Omitted Formulations
C.1 Formulation from Section 8.1
Let ξmed be the median value of ξ over the dataset. Breaking ties arbitrarily, ξmed occurs
for some observation j = jmed. Let pmed1 , p
med
2 , ξ
med
1 , ξ
med
2 be the corresponding prices and
demand shocks at time jmed. (Recall that in this section ξ = ξ1 = ξ2.) These definitiosn make
precise what we mean in the main text by “fixing other variables to the median observation.
Denote by p
1
, p
2
the minimum prices observed over the data set.
Our parametric formation in Sec. 8.1 is
min
y,,θ1,θ2
‖‖∞ (39a)
s.t. yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N,
yji ≥Mi(pj1, pj2, ξj ;θi), i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , N,
2∑
i=1
pjyji − (pji )Mi(pj1, pj2, ξj ;θi) ≤ j , j = 1, . . . , N,
M1(p
j
1, p
med
2 , ξ
med;θ1) ≥M1(pk1 , pmed2 , ξmed;θ1), ,∀1 ≤ j, k ≤ N s.t. pj1 ≤ pk1 ,
(39b)
M2(p
med
1 , p
j
2, ξ
med;θ2) ≥M2(pmed1 , pk2 , ξmed;θ2), ,∀1 ≤ j, k ≤ N s.t. pj2 ≤ pk2 ,
(39c)
M1(p1, p
med
2 , ξ
med;θ1) = M
∗
1 (p1, p
med
2 , ξ
med
1 ;θ
∗
1) (39d)
M2(p
med
1 , p2, ξ
med;θ2) = M
∗
2 (p
med
1 , p2, ξ
med
2 ;θ
∗
2) (39e)
Here M1 and M2 are given by Eq. (32). Notice, for this choice, the optimization is a linear
optimization problem.
Eqs. (39b) and (39c) constrain the fitted function to be non-decreasing in the firm’s own
price. Eqs. (39d) and (39e) are normalization conditions. We have chosen to normalize the
functions to be equal to the true functions at this one point to make the visual comparisons
easier. In principle, any suitable normalization can be used.
Our nonparametric formulation is similar to the above, but we replace
– The parametric M1(·,θ1),M2(·,θ2) with nonparametric M1(·),M2(·) ∈ H
– The objective by ‖‖1 + λ(‖M1‖H + ‖M2‖H).
By Theorem 4 and the discussion in Section 6, we can rewrite this optimization as a convex
quadratic program.
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C.2 Formulation from Section 8.2
Our parametric formulation is nearly identical to the parametric formulation in Appendix C.1,
with the following changes:
– Replace Eq. (39a) by ‖‖∞ + λ(‖θ1‖1 + ‖θ2‖1)
– Replace the definition of M1,M2 by Eq. (33).
Our nonparametric formulation is identical to the nonparametric formulation of the pre-
vious section.
